Ambushes, Elections & Stalemates

Welcome to the History of Ireland. A few episodes ago you’ll remember that I’d said the Hawks, i.e. those pro-war within the British establishment, had argued that they could take back control of Ireland by April of 1921. They gave themselves this deadline so that the elections for the southern and northern jurisdictions created by the Government of Ireland Act could be held. Today we’re going to look at whether or not they succeeded, ask the question who was winning this war, and explore the elections themselves.

Across the country there were a range of losses on both sides between March, April and May. If you were to make a timeline, well, nearly every single day of those three months has some kind of attack, ambush or assassination. I’m going to just quickly fly through a few notable events. First, on March 8th you had what became known as the Curfew Murders, where Sinn Féin Limerick Mayor George Clancy and former Mayor Michael O’Callaghan were killed by the British in their homes late at night. Then on March 10th, four more IRA men were killed in Nadd, County Cork. Six Flying Column men were killed in Longford on March 11th. Interestingly, on that same day, Dáil Éireann decided to declare war on the British administration, which I think is a bit late if you ask me.

Then, at the end of April, the British began running a series of raids throughout Dublin and managed to capture four machine guns, 30 rifles, over 150 revolvers and 20,000 rounds of ammunition, in what was a crushing blow to the IRA. They also managed to capture 40 Dublin IRA men. Meanwhile, throughout May, the Mayo Brigades launched a sustained campaign, leading a range of ambushes on May 3rd, May 19th and May 23rd, with casualties on both sides. And then, you even had IRA men leading attacks within England at the behest of Carl Brewer. There was a series of arson attacks being carried out throughout March, April and May, and it had a huge psychological effect on the British, further turning the public against the war.

But I think one event in particular, the Crossbury Ambush, is an interesting microcosm with which to examine the entire war. It occurred on March 19th and involved our old friends Tom Barry and the 3rd Cork Brigade. After the mess that was the Clonmoult ambush, one of the IRA prisoners offered up the location of the 3rd Cork Brigade’s headquarters. This had hundreds of auxiliaries moving through the area, patrolling and searching for the brigade. With planes flying overhead and British patrols sweeping the country, Tom Barry knew he and his men were in trouble.

Then, early in the morning on March 19th, Barry realised they were fully surrounded. The British had created a ring of around 350 soldiers and were slowly moving in on Barry’s location. At this point Barry had one of the largest flying columns the war had seen, with 104 members. Now, he claimed there were 1000 British soldiers, but this is kind of nonsense and should be a cautionary tale to those who trust first hand accounts at face value. Though on the other hand, I guess, maybe that’s what it felt like to him. When you’re outnumbered 3 to 1 and you have hardly any ammo anyway, 300 enemy soldiers traipsing through your home start to feel like a hell of a lot more. In terms of sheer manpower, it’s one of the largest incidences of the war.

Barry knew he had to escape, and spectacularly he and his men managed to ambush 3 lorries, break through the circle of British soldiers, hide up elsewhere in the county, and they only lost 2 men in the process. So it kind of sounds like a win for the IRA, right? Well, yes and no. This was the last major attack Tom Barry and his men carried out. From this point on, the area was simply too overrun with British soldiers for Barry and his men to do anything successfully. So that sounds like the British had the upper hand. Except, well, Barry was still out there.

This conundrum was occurring across the country. By sheer force of numbers, the British had the IRA on their last legs. The British command post in Ireland pointed out that by the beginning of April 6th, the initiative had passed definitively to the troops, and that May constituted a period of almost unbroken success. They sound positively giddy, saying, assisted by the fine summer weather, encouraged by the promise of further reinforcements and increased powers in July, everybody threw themselves with still greater energy into the struggle. No place, however remote, could be regarded as a safe retreat for the wanted men.

But this wasn’t exactly true. As MacReady put it, quote, we were getting into a difficult position. If the military burned a cottage, then the Sinn Feiners burned two, then the military four, and so on. This reprisal policy was becoming less and less effective and less popular, further turning the British public against the war. Plus, it just wasn’t working, it wasn’t effective. The IRA had managed to survive on their last legs for months. They were outmanned and outgunned but were still successfully outmanoeuvring the British. That’s the beauty of a guerrilla force. All the IRA had to do to succeed was survive. It was a fascinating kind of stalemate.

One way in which the IRA tried to ensure their survival and gain the upper hand was the reorganisation and decentralisation of the command structure. This occurred in April in a bid to increase coordination between the brigades and to ensure the war could continue regardless of whether the GHQ was destroyed. Due to the grassroots nature of the IRA and the Flying Columns, it was not uncommon for various different units to be completely unaware of what their counterpart one county over might be doing. If the GHQ was destroyed, there was a danger that any kind of cooperation would completely disappear.

With this in mind, around eight divisional commands were set up. Mulcahy argued that each division must come more and more to regard itself as a definitive unit capable of carrying on a formidable campaign unaided, an army in miniature. They were set up by geography but covered a wider ground and encompassed more men than the traditional brigades or county units had done previously. But it’s kind of funny. The beauty of the IRA was that it didn’t really need top-down command. But this was clearly also a risk and was causing difficulty. The divisions were a form of compromise. Officially giving more control to local leaders, but doing so in a way that would give some kind of top-down command and hopefully bring in some kind of cooperation. There was also the added bonus of it being a chance to provide a bunch of promotions to soldiers. A small and probably ill-conceived means of trying to boost morale.

Some argued that it was all totally unnecessary. As our friend Tom Barry put it, the new structure, quote, did not and could not add a man, a rifle, a bomb, a round of ammunition or a shilling to the strength of any brigade. Nor did it organize any action or issue a single operation to any unit. What it did do was further create a rift between some of the men on the ground and those in quote on quote command. The lads out in the field saw it as little more than needless administration and paperwork. As one IRA soldier put it, we started this war with hurleys, but by heavens it seems to me we’ll finish it off with fountain pens.

If we look at this holistically for a second, it points to a few issues in the IRA. It’s clear there was at times a lack of cooperation between brigades and a clear disconnect between the leaders and the men on the ground. Both of these facts are important to remember once we start looking at what occurred after the war ended. But whatever the IRA were doing, it was working. By the end of April it was abundantly clear to the British government that quote definitive and decisive results had not been reached.

The cabinet debated postponing the elections, but on April 21st it was decided to go ahead regardless of the chaos throughout the country. The main motive for this was to ensure the legislator in the north of the country could begin governing. Interestingly, Sinn Féin and the republican government had decided to get involved in the election. This was despite two glaring issues. First, the obvious problem that it was an election called for by the British government as part of the Government of Ireland Act, which Sinn Féin was vehemently against. And second, there was a real danger that it acknowledged partition. Because of this there was a debate over whether or not the northern parliament should be boycotted.

Simon de Valera worried that if Sinn Féin ignored the election and won no seats, then as he explained to Michael Collins, quote, it would look as if these counties were practically a homogenous political entity which justified partition. Dev also argued that the election was a great chance for propaganda and that quote the will of the people could once more be demonstrated. And so Sinn Féin took part in an election that was being organised by the enemy side. I’d love to know whether or not this has happened anywhere else in history, because to me it just sounds kind of crazy.

The results tell us a lot. First of all, in the north, Sinn Féin ended up only winning 6 seats. It had aimed to win 10, and the fact that they didn’t really didn’t help the case against partition. In the south they had an easier time of it. They ran unopposed in all but 4 seats, the unionist Dublin university seats. Labour had continued to keep out of the election so as not to dilute Sinn Féin’s power. Sometimes I think this approach was a bit of a shame, as it removed a lot of Labour’s power, and some of the more radical pro-worker positions that had been held in the early parts of the republican movement slipped away and were diluted.

In terms of those who ran for Sinn Féin, it’s kind of an interesting story. Over a third were IRA officers, up from a fifth in the previous election. As the historian Charles Townsend puts it, this demonstrated a shift in the internal balance of the republican movement towards the military side. And of the 125 ministers, 48 were arrested and 52 were on the run. Which just shows how difficult a situation the Irish movement was in at this point. But it also shows their determination to keep going.

After the election, De Valère devolved what is known as the first Dáil, and the second Dáil was set up. Sounds like a silly or simple categorisation. But it’s vital to acknowledge the importance of the first Dáil. They literally, through sheer bloody stubbornness, formed their own government right under the nose of the world’s largest empire. The second Dáil would bring everything to a close, and prove that Sinn Féin were much more than a murder gang.

In the next episode, we’re going to look at one of the last big actions undertaken by the IRA, and explore why it was very much a Pyrrhic victory. This podcast was recorded in the lands of the Wurundjeri people of the Kulin Nation. Sovereignty was never ceded.